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RECENT DECISIONS
committing his crime in January, 1960, was afforded the very same rights
denied to Negri. For such an invidious result Negri may thank the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the speedy criminal court procedures
of Pennsylvania, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court feels should not
be "slowed down" by the new trials of those incarcerated victims who
were denied their constitutional rights. Furthermore, the court seems
oblivious to the fact that a confession obtained at an accusatorial proceed-
ing is just as damaging as a confession at the trial level. Also it is not
reasonable to assume that the right to counsel at a trial is more "funda-
mental" than at an accusatorial proceeding, since a confession at the
accusatorial proceeding may for all practical purposes nullify the benefit
of counsel at the trial level.
Thus, in the final analysis, the court has adopted the Russo view of
Escobedo, requiring the police to afford counsel in an accusatory pre-trial
proceeding whether counsel is requested or not and thus by necessity
concedes that Negri was denied his constitutional rights. Yet, by refusing
to apply Escobedo retrospectively, they deny him a remedy.2 4
Joseph Pass, Jr.
TORTs-Parental Immunity-New Hampshire has now joined the trend
toward the abolition of the parental immunity doctrine.
Dean v. Smith,- N.H. -, 211 A.2d 410 (1965).
In June of this year the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in Dean v.
Smith,' had occasion to re-evaluate the parental immunity doctrine. The
case arose out of an automobile accident, in which the father was killed
and his three unemancipated children were severely injured. It was
subsequently determined that the accident had occurred due to the negli-
gence of the father. A suit was brought against the father's estate by the
mother of the children to (1) enforce her own claim for medical, hospital
and nursing expenses incurred on behalf of the children, and (2) to
enforce the personal injury claims of each minor child.2 This presented a
question to the court of whether or not an unemancipated child could
maintain a suit in negligence against his parent.
The defendant Smith (the personal representative of the deceased
23. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
24. There was a dissenting opinion filed by Mr. Justice Roberts and joined by Mr.
Justice Musmanno in which they advocated that the denial of the right to counsel in the
accusatory pre-trial investigation was a denial of a fundamental right which is a direct
prejudice against a fair trial and thus Escobedo should be applied retrospectively.
1. - N.H. -, 211 A.2d 410 (1965).
2. The car was insured under an effective policy of general coverage.
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father) relied on Worrall v. Moran,' in which this same New Hampshire
court had applied the parental immunity doctrine. Worrall represents the
majority view in the United States today. The origin of the doctrine is
ascribed to Hewlett v. Ragsdale,4 in which it .is stated,
so long as the parent is under obligation to care for, guide and
control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and
comfort and obey, no such action as this can be maintained.'
The underlying rationale of the doctrine is ". . . that domestic tranquillity
and parental discipline would be disturbed by the action."6 The court in
the Dean case considered this, but stated that since the father had died,
a suit against his estate would be less likely to disrupt family relations
and parental discipline. A second important factor contributing to the
court's decision was that the Dean automobile was insured under a policy
of general coverage.
The fact that most parents have provided for payment by an
insurer for the damages which might be assessed in an action
against them or their estate by their unemancipated children is
also a factor which decreases the likelihood that such an action
will disrupt family harmony or deplete the family exchequer.7
On the basis of these considerations, the court held that the suit could be
maintained. Thus the parental immunity doctrine was rejected and the
Worrall case was overruled.
The significance of the Dean decision is that it presents a reconsidera-
tion of the doctrine. New Hampshire no longer permits the parent to
shield his negligence behind an antiquated doctrine which has no place
in today's progressive society. Justice and common sense demanded that
a reconsideration of the doctrine would lead ultimately to its rejection.
As the court pointed out, such a suit (where the tortfeasor is dead) will
not disrupt family relations and disturb parental discipline. Also, most
parents realize the importance of insurance coverage and maintain effec-
tive policies. Thus, it is submitted that insurance will be of great impor-
tance in the development of the law in the area of parental immunity.
It is also a reasonable certainty that other jurisdictions will follow New
Hampshire in reconsidering and abolishing the parental immunity doc-
trine. It is hoped that quite soon the outdated doctrine of parental im-
munity, like its sister in the area of charity, will be reduced to a footnote
in the pages of legal history.
Carl J. Sauer
3. 101 N.H. 13, 131 A.2d 438 (1957).
4. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
5. Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
6. PROSSER, TORTS 887 (3d ed. 1964).
7. Dean v. Smith, supra note 1, at 413.
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